One thing that is wonderful about the United States is that we are country based on the law. What is stated in the law, and implemented through regulation, is the “word” by which things are followed. Or at least, one tries to do so. Which makes administrative law, of which immigration law is a specialized form of, quite interesting.

A very unusual circumstance presented itself today. In a I-539 change of status \ extension of stay case, we received an approval notice, followed by “Reopen Notice” provided on a I-797C with the same notice date as the approval notice.

 This presents some obvious and very interesting set of questions. 

• First, did the change of status actually go through, and therefore, which status is the client still in the US on?
• Second, what is the effect of the reopen notice on the approval?
• Third, why would DHS ever do something odd like this? On the same day?

I have some personal suspicions, which has to do with the way the system is setup and as to what generates the I-797C notices. Without going into detail, I suspect there was an administrative error during processing, since unlike most reopen notices, this was generated by the service itself and without any request for additional documentation. Usually one has 30 days to provide the additional documents in a motion to reopen. Since nothing was requested, and due to the timing of the notice, it was probably something as simple as hitting the wrong set of keys or buttons, and attempts to fix it using available administrative tools.

Calls did not clarify exactly what status the client is on, and I doubt we will ever get any useful explanation about what happened (At least, I never wrote detailed explanations for messages outbound about errors while I was working for the Feds, and I doubt anyone ever will). But even knowing why will not help the end-client, who obviously deserves certainty in knowing what status they are really in the US on, and if any extensions must be made and what type of extension to ask for, or if they can now engage in the new activity they planned on doing. 

In this I-539, a paradoxically interesting hint was given since it was about getting someone into F (student) status. Students must be part of the SEVIS program, and the status for the client was changed to “Active”. 

Hence, we go back to the joys of administrative law. All methods, including approvals and rejections, abide by a specific set of procedures outlined in the regulations. To reopen a case, for instance, one must follow the procedures for motions to reopen. In the old Adjudicator Field Manual 10.17, some hints are given as to how this occurs when the service itself performs a motion to reopen. The short answer is, it’s in 8 CFR 103.5(a).

Within 8 CFR 103.5(a) contains an interesting nugget in subpart (1)(iv) which states ““Unless the Service directs otherwise, the filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider or of a subsequent application or petition does not stay the execution of any decision in a case or extend a previously set departure date.” 

Therefore, the section of law that allows for the motion to reopen specifically says the prior “decision in a case” remains valid and is not “stay”ed until a decision is made or “[u]nless the service directs otherwise”. This is most typically used when the service denies an H-1B or L-1A, and while the case is on appeal, no benefits are retained by the denied beneficiary. This is why cases on appeal for H-1B or otherwise frequently seek help from federal courts, as a TRO might be the best option to allow the person to stay in the US and keep working during the pendency of the litigation.

But as demonstrated in this example, this regulation IS a double-edged sword; the logical interpretation of the regulation is if there is an approval, that prior action of approval remains valid because motion to reopen is not stayed, until such time the service directs otherwise. 

Thus the joys of administrative law. Keep in mind, of course, counter arguments can be made against this argument, and the uncertainty is what keeps administrative law fresh and interesting. However, the U.S. remains a country of laws, reasonable results should arise from a fair reading of the law (eventually – after the courts and parties have at it, so it isn’t necessary cheap for a specific client who is forced to be stuck litigating….), and it’s easy to figure out what should happen if one looks.

This seems to be a very basic question, but it comes up with surprising frequency: Can a beneficiary appeal their immigration petition case? For example, if the husband (petitioner) sponsors the I-130, the case is denied, and the husband doesn’t wish to appeal but the wife does. Can wife (beneficiary) appeal? What about if an employer doesn’t want to keep pushing the H-1B, but the employee does?

No – the beneficiary is out of luck. 8 CFR 103.2(a)(3) says “A beneficiary of petition is not a recognized party” for immigration petitions. But there are some interesting exceptions.

Remember that certain petitions are self-sponsored by the beneficiary. For example, EB-1As and National Interest Waivers are filed by a petitioner who is also the beneficiary.

Second, in the case of AC21 cases, where an employee changes employer and the former employer sponsored petition is being challenged, the employee may step in to appeal the case. In those cases the beneficiary has standing to appeal that revocation, as further detailed in https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2017/2017-11-11-PM-602-0152-Guidance-Beneficiary-Standing-Matter-of-V-S-G.pdf

Occasionally I receive calls in which someone who married a U.S. citizen is looking at naturalization (N-400). Individuals who are naturalizing through marriage may do so in three years instead of five. But what happens to the children, and what if the parent doesn’t naturalize but the children want to naturalize?

This usually involves step-children of the sponsoring U.S. citizen or LPR, usually the natural issue of the foreign spouse, who entered into the US as derivatives. These children are usually on LPR status in the United States. Sometimes they remain outside of the U.S., staying with a former spouse of the beneficiary of the petition.

Answering this question is deceptively complex, but the principal is simple: If the children aren’t adults, they become citizens when the parents are citizens. If they are adults, they have to naturalize on their own. 

First, ask the “location of children” question. Are they in the US or outside? Are these children of U.S. citizen military members? Children of U.S. citizen military members have special provision. 

Second, how old are the children? Are they under 18?

• Children over 18 cannot benefit from parent(s) naturalizing, and must seek their own N-400 petition (5 years).
• Children who are under 18 (and there is some debate on what counts as “under 18”) become U.S. citizens (naturalize) the moment their parents do, when certain conditions are met.
• Children under 18 cannot naturalize on their own unless they are active members of the U.S. military.

Third, if the children are in the US, do they already have LPR status and does the US citizen parent have legal and physical custody of the child? If they are outside of the US, does the transmitting parent meet the physical presence requirement and can the child be admitted and enter the US? If these prerequisites are met, the child is a U.S. citizen. 

This is a greatly simplified version of the discussion USCIS has on their page. Basically, will a parent naturalize and how old is the kid? If under 18, the kids get only what the parent has and become citizens automatically when certain requirements are met. If over 18, the kids have to naturalize on their own. The details can be found in 12 USCIS Policy Manual, Part H.